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Abstract The deep drop of the fertility rate in Italy to among the lowest in the
world challenges contemporary theories of childbearing and family building.
Among high-income countries, Italy was presumed to have characteristics of family
values and female labor force participation that would favor higher fertility than its
European neighbors to the north. We test competing economic and cultural
explanations, drawing on new nationally representative, longitudinal data to
examine ﬁrst union, ﬁrst birth, and second birth. Our event history analysis ﬁnds
some support for economic determinants of family formation and fertility, but the
clear importance of regional differences and of secularization suggests that such an
explanation is at best incomplete and that cultural and ideational factors must be
considered.
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Re ´sume ´ La fe ´condite ´ a baisse ´ de fac ¸on tre `s marque ´e en Italie, pour atteindre a `
pre ´sent un des niveaux les plus bas du monde, ce qui repre ´sente un de ´ﬁ pour les
the ´ories contemporaines de la procre ´ation et de la formation des familles. Parmi les
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DOI 10.1007/s10680-008-9159-5pays a ` revenus e ´leve ´s, l’Italie disposait de caracte ´ristiques en matie `re de valeurs
familiales et de participation des femmes au marche ´ du travail qui auraient du ˆ lui
permettre de be ´ne ´ﬁcier d’une fe ´condite ´ plus e ´leve ´e que celle des pays voisins vers
le Nord. Nous testons des hypothe `ses e ´conomiques et culturelles, a ` l’aide de
nouvelles donne ´es longitudinales repre ´sentatives a ` l’e ´chelle nationale, nous per-
mettant d’examiner la premie `re union et les premie `re et seconde naissances.
L’analyse biographique que nous avons mene ´e fournit des e ´le ´ments en faveur des
de ´terminants e ´conomiques de la formation des familles et de la fe ´condite ´, mais
l’importance des diffe ´rences re ´gionales et de la se ´cularisation sugge `re que ce type
d’explication est au mieux incomplet, et que des facteurs culturels et normatifs
doivent e ˆtre pris en conside ´ration.
Mots-cle ´s Fe ´condite ´  Formation des unions  Italie  The ´ories de ´mographiques 
Analyse biographique  Changement social  Diffe ´rences ge ´ographiques
1 Introduction
The geographic distribution of very low fertility among the countries of the world,
especially within Europe, remains a puzzle. Rapidly falling fertility in these
Western countries, many scholars argued, could be explained by the massive entry
of women into the extra-domestic labor force. Others, doubting that a purely
economic approach would prove adequate, identiﬁed basic culture change as
generating very low fertility. Along these lines, Second Demographic Transition
(SDT) theorists pointed to a shift in cultural values linked both to a move away from
familism toward self-realization and a shift from religious attachments toward
secularism.
The fact that by the early 1990s Italy and Spain emerged as the countries with the
lowest fertility proved a major surprise, if not an embarrassment. In the European
context, both countries showed unusually low rates of female labor force
participation (FLFP) and relatively strong family bonds and religious institutions.
As Chesnais (1998, p. 91) pointed out, ‘‘No ofﬁcial population forecast, either
national or international, had anticipated a total fertility rate of 1.2 for any country,
[much] less for Mediterranean countries, which are still commonly viewed as
‘‘laggards’’ and ... family-oriented. This outcome is probably the biggest surprise of
European demographics at the end of the present century.’’ The longstanding
fertility differential between Northern and Southern Europe was unexpectedly
reversed. Countries viewed as traditional, Catholic, and family-oriented inexplica-
bly had markedly lower fertility than those that were Protestant, more secular, and
had weaker family ties (Chesnais 1996, p. 729).
In this article we provide a detailed empirical analysis of the Italian case to shed
light on the adequacy of current demographic theorizing on very low fertility. We
begin by introducing some major threads in the arguments and offer relevant
background on Italy. We then introduce our data and present a series of event
history models with longitudinal microdata. We conclude by considering the
theoretical lessons of the Italian case.
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123To date, economic theories of various kinds have dominated the theoretical
debate on very low fertility. Following Becker (1976) and other neoclassical
economists (Mincer 1963), much work has focused on increased female autonomy,
the movement of more women into the labor force, and calculations of the direct and
indirect costs of childbearing to the family economy. At a more macro-level,
Easterlin (1976) and colleagues (Easterlin and Cummins 1991) have advanced a
theory of relative economic deprivation, linking fertility decisions to economic
opportunities related to relative cohort sizes and to judgments based on expected
levels of economic well-being linked to demographic and economic cycles. As
noted by Macunovich (1997), neither theory seemed to be born out by the course of
fertility in the world’s wealthier countries in recent years.
The economic feature that has most attracted theorists’ attention has been
increasing levels of FLFP. Economic theory successfully predicts the substitution of
activity away from childbearing and childrearing with growing wage opportunity
for women at the individual level. Yet at the country level the correlation between
FLFP and TFR reversed from being negative in the 1960s to sharply positive in the
1990s (Ko ¨gel 2004; Morgan 2003). Bernhardt (1993, p. 32) has argued that ‘‘the
inhibiting effect of work on fertility has been at least partially removed with the help
of social and institutional arrangements,’’ citing in particular the provision of
publicly funded childcare, maternity leave, and tax beneﬁts (Gauthier 1996). In the
past several years, researchers have turned attention to various social policies and
public institutions that might affect the relationship between women’s work and the
cost of childbearing. The reasoning suggests that the differences in both labor
market participation and fertility rates in different western countries can largely be
attributed to the characteristics of institutions like childcare system, parental leave
arrangements, and labor market ﬂexibility (Engelhardt and Prskawetz 2004;
Rindfuss et al. 2003; Brewster and Rindfuss 2000).
In particular, it has been noted how in Scandinavian countries and France, public
policies encourage both female work and childbearing by easing the childcare
burden for dual earner families. This is done through public support in the form of
affordable childcare services, generous maternity leaves, and protection of part-time
employment. In Anglo-Saxon countries the ﬂexible frame for part-time employment
and the private childcare services offered by the market may compensate for more
limited welfare provisions. By contrast, it is argued, in Southern Europe labor
market rigidities and imperfections biased toward full-time or limited employment
contracts, an inadequate supply of public childcare, and other institutional
constraints, combine to make work and parenthood highly incompatible (Del Boca
and Pasqua 2005b). It is further argued that while relaxation of these labor market
rigidities (to enable more part-time employment) may increase overall female labor
force participation, the shift may come with the cost of lower fertility in these
settings of Southern Europe (Del Boca et al. 2005a).
The ‘‘incompatibility impasse’’ in Southern European countries seems to explain
the survival of the negative relationship between FLFP and fertility in these settings
(Ko ¨gel 2004). ‘‘Trends in the variables that would be representative for the role
incompatibility hypothesis and the ease in combining work and child-rear-
ing … cannot be related to the trends in fertility.’’ (Engelhardt and Prskawetz
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1232004, p. 55). The childcare link seems to remain problematic. There is signiﬁcant
European cross-national variation in the use of public and private childcare, but
little evident correlation with fertility (Kiernan 1998).
Taking a different perspective, a number of scholars have argued that no
adequate theory of fertility can be developed that does not incorporate an
understanding of culture (Kertzer 1995, 1997). Most prominent in this regard has
been Second Demographic Transition (SDT) theory (van de Kaa 1987; Lesthaeghe
and Surkyn 1998, p. 8). This approach identiﬁes a shift toward individualization and
secularization and links it to the almost contemporaneous fall of fertility to below
replacement. Van de Kaa and other second transition theorists attribute this
transition to a basic shift toward values emphasizing ‘‘the rights and self-fulﬁllment
of individuals’’ (van de Kaa 1987, p. 5) and away from traditional family-oriented
values, citing the dramatic increase in late-twentieth-century Europe in divorce,
cohabitation, and non-marital childbearing. Yet the countries in Europe that
currently have the lowest fertility are those showing the strongest commitment to
the traditional forms of family formation, with relatively low divorce, non-marital
cohabitation, and illegitimacy rates, and in the propensity of adult children to
remain in their parental household until marriage and to live very close to them
thereafter (McDonald 2001).
To gain better insight into these different mechanisms—secular change, labor
force participation, public institutions, and family culture—it is desirable to go
beyond aggregate inter-country comparisons and to look more carefully at changing
fertility behavior within a country. We do so here by examining the Italian case.
2 Low Fertility in Italy—Stylized Facts
Italy’s well-known position in cross-national comparisons of fertility trends does not
tellmuchaboutthehistoricalvariationinthepathoffertilitydeclineacrossitsregions.
While it is true that fertility declined in all regions, such decline started at very
different moments and proceeded at very different speeds in the various regions. In
tracing the geographical pattern of marital fertility decline across Italian provinces (a
lower level of aggregation than the regions) through the 19th and the 20th centuries,
LiviBacciobservesthat‘‘intheareaswithanearlydeclineinfertility[theNorth],neo-
Malthusian attitudes had spread at an uneven pace because of deep economic and
social differences among the various sectors of the population. [...] On the other hand
in the South, where the population is perhaps more homogeneous in its socio-
economic characteristics and certainly culturally less differentiated, acceptance of
neo-Malthusianattitudeswasrelativelyslowandlateanddidnotgeneratepronounced
fertility differentials’’ (Livi Bacci 1977, pp. 180 and 181).
Replacement levels of fertility were reached in parts of the North beginning with
the 1910 birth cohort, while as late as the early 1980s the TFR in a number of
southern regions still stood above replacement.
1 Over the last two decades of the
1 In this discussion and below we will make use of broad regions: Northwest, Northeast, Center, and
South; The Northwest and Northeast together comprise the North.
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12320th century, fertility in northern and central Italy remained stable, while the
southern regions experienced continuing sharp fertility decline. By the century’s
end, Campania (centered on Naples), although still having the highest fertility in the
country, had a TFR of only 1.5. Remarkably, Sardinia, known for its economic
underdevelopment, rugged terrain, and traditionalism, and which in 1960 had the
highest TFR in Italy (3.5), as might comfortably comport with both economic and
SDT theory, had Italy’s lowest fertility (1.04) by the end of the century (Dalla
Zuanna and Crisafulli 2002, Table 2). Despite the current observed convergence of
regional fertility rates, Italian regions are still marked by important variations in
demographic, economic, and social patterns. This regional and temporal variation
makes the Italian case an especially fruitful one for theoretical exploration of the
impact of economic factors and cultural values on fertility.
Substantial variation also characterizes the levels of female labor force
participation (FLFP) in the different regions, yet the correlation between regional
2003 TFR and regional FLFP (of women 25–34) is a modest -0.24. Women in the
North of Italy are much more likely to have paid employment. In the mid-1990s,
64% of women aged 20–49 in the Northwest, but only 36% in the South did paid
work. Even more strikingly, 41% of the southern women had never been in the labor
force, compared to only 7% of those in the Northwest (Bernardi 1999, p. 753).
Indeed, the increase in FLFP has been quite modest in the South, with the proportion
of women who had ever entered the labor force rising only from 41% among those
born before 1929 to 51% in the 1944–58 birth cohort (compared to 84% in the
North) and little sign of any increase since then (Barbagli et al. 2003, Table 1.8).
Among women with children under age six in the mid-1990s, 62% of the
Northerners and only 31% of the Southerners were employed (Sabbadini 1999,
Table 3.5). A 1998 national sample survey (Famiglia e Soggetti Sociali, FSS) asked
all individuals if they had ever been in the paid labor force. The persistence of
strong regional differences, particularly a North-South contrast, is clear. In the
South, 50% of the 1941–50 birth cohorts had never entered the labor force, while in
the North only 20% had refrained from participation. By the 1961–70 cohorts the
ﬁgure had increased to 54% in the South, while it had decreased to around 10% in
the northern regions. The center of the country remained intermediate.
A third element of regional variation is represented by the ideational dimension
related to gender norms and union formation. There is consistent empirical evidence
that egalitarian gender norms and spousal (female) autonomy are stronger in the
North (Sabbadini 1999, Table 6.3), where premarital cohabitation rates and divorce
rates are also notably higher (1999: Table 4.7; Barbagli 1990). Behavioral and
attitudinal indicators that tap individualization vary regionally, declining as one
moves from the most secularized Northwest to the traditional South (Table 1). By
contrast, there is one cultural feature that shows relatively limited regional
difference and that is the propensity of young adults to live with their parents before
marriage (Sabbadini 1999, Table 5.3) and to choose residential arrangements very
close to their parents thereafter (Cioni 1997; Bordignon et al. 2006).
While a regional comparison leads to doubts about the adequacy of an
explanation focusing on women’s work, attempts to link regional level cultural
differences of the sort theorized by SDT theorists to fertility levels lend little
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123support to this alternative. Of all marriages in Italy in 2001, over a quarter were
conducted civilly, generally in the local town hall. In Italy’s largest northern
regions—Piedmont, Lombardy, Veneto, Liguria—the proportion of religious
marriages ranged from 60 to 69%. In Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany, in the heart
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for ILFI sample
Variables Mean values
1st union 1st birth 2nd birth
Individual traits (TV = time-varying)
Northwest (TV) [Ref] 0.12 0.15 0.14
Northeast (TV) 0.25 0.30 0.26
Center (TV) 0.27 0.28 0.28
South (TV) 0.36 0.27 0.32
Cohort 1941–50 [Ref] 0.31 0.34 0.37
Cohort 1951–60 0.33 0.36 0.36
Cohort 1961–70 0.36 0.30 0.27
Mother worked 0.36 0.34 0.34
Father’s education elementary 0.66 0.70 0.72
Father’s education middle 0.13 0.13 0.12
Father’s education high school [Ref] 0.10 0.09 0.08
Father’s education post-secondary 0.11 0.08 0.08
Father died (TV) 0.05 0.17 0.16
Mother died (TV) 0.02 0.08 0.06
Education of respondent secondary or less NA 0.56 0.59
Education of respondent high school [Ref] 0.34 0.33
Education of respondent post-secondary NA 0.10 0.08
Employed (TV) NA 0.56 0.52
In a civil union (Religious ref) 0.07 0.05
Entered union, Age 15–19 0.16
Entered union, Age 20–24 0.51
Entered union, Age 25–29 [Ref] 0.27
Entered union, Age 30–34 0.05
Entered union, Age 35–39 0.01
Entered union, Age 40+ 0.00
Age at ﬁrst birth, 15–19 0.09
Age at ﬁrst birth, 20–24 0.42
Age at ﬁrst birth, 25–29 0.34
Age at ﬁrst birth, 30–34 [Ref] 0.12
Age at ﬁrst birth, 35–49 0.04
N Women (at spell onset) 3,400 2,916 1,914
N Women (at spell onset) 3,400 2,916 1,914
NA = Few women have completed education or been employed at the onset of risk (age 15) for union;
subspells incorporate changes to these variables. Time varying covariates are lagged 12 months
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123of Italy’s red belt, with its anticlerical and left-wing tradition, only 63% of weddings
were celebrated in Church. By contrast, in no part of the mainland South was the
percentage of religious marriages under 80%, and in the deep South (Puglia,
Basilicata, Calabria) it was near 90%. Yet plotting regional TFR against regional
percentage of religious marriages in 2003 offers little evidence of any link between
secularization and low fertility (ﬁgure not shown). Italy’s least secularized region
using this measure was the deep southern region of Basilicata, where only 9% of
marriages were celebrated outside a church, yet in 2003 Basilicata’s TFR was 1.20,
2
actually below the national average.
3 Testing Economic and Cultural Theory at the Individual Level
Regional-level analysis of the Italian case fails to ﬁnd much support for either FLFP
or SDT theories of very low fertility. We now turn to micro-level data to see
whether the predicted relationships may, while obscured in regional level
comparisons, be evident in individual behavior. We analyze data from the Italian
Longitudinal Family Study (ILFI), the only ongoing prospective social survey in
Italy. Based on an original sample of 4,404 households within which all members
are interviewed (9,770 individuals[18 years old), ILFI includes detailed fertility
histories that make it especially valuable for our analysis. The ﬁrst wave of the panel
took place in 1997 and we here analyze data through the ﬁrst three waves (1997,
1999, 2001). Men and women aged 18–49 constitute about 60% of the initial
sample. The dynamic nature of the sample means that at every wave it loses all
individuals who (a) died, (b) migrated abroad, or (c) became severely impaired; and
it gains individuals who (a) reach age 18 and belong to the originally sampled
households, and (b) enter via union or cohabitation. ILFI is representative of the
Italian population nationally.
3
Looking at Italian women born in 1941–1970 we examine three crucial life
course transitions: marriage, the transition from marriage to ﬁrst birth, and the
transition from ﬁrst to second birth. It is in these cohorts—who began entering their
reproductive years in 1955 and whose fertility primarily occurred between 1960 and
2001—that the dramatic and puzzling fall of Italian childbearing is most clearly
manifest.
Women in birth cohorts 1941–1970 were approximately 30–60 years old at the
time of the ILFI survey. For the youngest cohorts, we cannot observe all their
childbearing exposure, although our models adjust for censoring. Premature
mortality of selectively differential women could affect our results, although given
limited female mortality at these ages it is likely that any such effect is slight.
2 These values come from our analysis of ISTAT data.
3 ILFI, under the direction of Antonio Schizzerotto, samples a nationally representative fraction of
households with a multi-stage design. Sampling fractions are identical across regions, except that
Trentino is oversampled. This adds approximately 319 households from this region. We use the data with
the ﬁlter that includes only the nationally representative portion. Results with the augmented sample show
little difference. This also makes it unnecessary to weight descriptive statistics.
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123We analyze each of these three transitions with Cox regression models and
introduce a set of covariates designed to capture both ﬁxed and time-varying traits
of the women. Of course, it is only women who experience one of these cumulative
life transitions who join the population of women at risk of experiencing the next
transition. Thus, we can expect that successive transitions tap a pool of women who
are increasingly selective. We present pooled and cohort-speciﬁc models, after
having explored a large number of alternative speciﬁcations.
Following our interest in weighing the potential value of theories that focus on
women’s work on the one hand, and secularization (SDT theory) on the other, we
pay particular attention to two variables: (1) whether the woman is in the work
force, which is lagged by one year so as to capture a possible causal effect; and (2)
whether the woman was married in church or in a civil marriage. The number of
cohabiting couples in the sample is too small to incorporate a separate measure of
this form of union. We regard civil marriage as a compelling indicator of the
secularization of Italian society, consistent with the concept of the Second
Demographic Transition. Just because civil marriage is a strong measure of
secularization, it has the limitation for our purposes of being relatively uncommon
among the oldest cohorts.
In the analysis to follow, we organize our presentation by event: ﬁrst union, ﬁrst
birth, second birth. In each case we introduce overall descriptive differentials for the
outcome by region and cohort. Then we move to multivariate Cox regressions.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all covariates in the ILFI analysis.
4 First Union
Among the factors often cited as contributing to very low fertility is a postponement
of marriage to ever-later ages. Such a factor might be thought to be especially
inﬂuential in Italy, where childbearing remains closely tied to marriage. Italy has, in
fact, been among the countries that have recently experienced a sharp rise in the age
at ﬁrst marriage. From 1985 to 2001 women’s mean age at ﬁrst marriage rose
dramatically, from 23.8 to 28.5.
4
In analyzing the transition to marriage we follow convention in taking age 15 to
indicate the onset of risk and so model the duration from age 15 to (age at) ﬁrst
union. Women are censored at the time of the survey if they have not yet entered a
union. In this analysis we take only formal unions (civil and religious marriages) to
constitute an event ending the spell. Cohabitation is relatively rare in Italy; thus, the
sparseness of the events made cohabitation difﬁcult to analyze separately.
Furthermore our preliminary analysis suggested that cohabiters may be qualitatively
different from those entering formal unions.
In descriptive data via Kaplan Meier survival analysis, we observe dramatic
differences by cohort, with the youngest cohort, born in 1961–70, showing a marked
slowdown in marital timing while in both the 1941–50 and the 1961–70 cohorts
4 The1980ﬁgureisfromCouncilofEurope,RecentdemographicdevelopmentsinEurope,2004,Table2.3.
The 2001 ﬁgure is from ISTAT, Matrimoni, separazioni e divorzi, anno 2001, Table 1.4.
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123about two-thirds of women had married by age 25, only 39% of women in the
youngest cohort had done so by that age. In fact, our Kaplan Meier data indicate that
after 20 years of exposure (accounting for censoring)—that is at age 35—about one-
third of the youngest cohort had yet to enter a formal union.
5
Figure 1 presents the survival curves for the duration to ﬁrst union, drawn
separately by region. We deﬁne ‘‘macroregion’’ to be an aggregation from 20
administrative regions into 4 larger regions, as used in our introduction and by other
analysts. Our entire ILFI sample born since 1940 (age 30–60 at time of survey) is
represented in these graphs. Here we observe only modest differences for the rate of
entry into ﬁrst union. This lack of regional difference in marriage rates is itself
noteworthy, in that, as we shall show below, our geographic depictions of fertility
rates point to signiﬁcant differences across the four macro regions of Italy.
We extend these descriptive portraits with regression models, in which we test
for the relative inﬂuence of cohort, region, and a number of potentially inﬂuential
traits of each woman. These include family background factors—mother’s work
experience, father’s education, death of mother and father—as well as the woman’s
own education and employment status. Our model speciﬁcations are successively
more inclusive, although we only present selected speciﬁcations here.
6
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Fig. 1 Duration to union by macroregion
5 To the extent that the very youngest members of the youngest cohort have not had this full exposure,
their differential behavior (such as more rapid entry into marriage after prolonged delay) will not be
represented in these graphs.
6 In most cases individual covariates are fairly robust to alternative speciﬁcation, particularly the addition
of other traits presumed to be exogenous. We have estimated alternative models (not shown) that include
covariates whose causal priority is more questionable. Even when we can establish temporal priority, one
can ask whether these characteristics—living with parents, self-classiﬁcation as a ‘‘student’’—are not in
fact jointly determined with the marriage and family building choices we model. After estimating pooled
models, we split the sample by birth cohort and repeat the estimation of the preferred model.
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15 to ﬁrst union. Coefﬁcients are presented in relative risk format, and hence
indicate the proportional shift in the baseline hazard due to a unit change in that
variable, i.e. membership in that category.
Model 1 includes only cohort and region. Unsurprisingly, given the known
secular trend, we observe appreciable cohort differences. Women in the youngest
birth cohort (1961–70) marry at about 52% of the rate of women in the reference
(1941–50) cohort. There are essentially no differences between the two oldest
cohorts. Regional differences are very modest and are not signiﬁcant at conven-
tional levels. Again there is no appreciable difference between the Northwest macro
region (reference)—the area identiﬁed with the earliest attainment of very low
fertility—and the Northeast and the Center. Women in the South exhibit a relative
risk of 90%, but this difference is not statistically signiﬁcant.
7
Our next model introduces the standard set of covariates suitable for the
prediction of ﬁrst union. As mentioned above, these include measures of economic
background, parental mortality, woman’s own education, and, especially, employ-
ment. (Death of mother, death of father, and woman’s employment are all time-
varying covariates.) In the presence of these additional personal traits the effects of
region and cohort shift modestly. Regional effects become more pronounced (with
all regions exhibiting lower relative risks compared to the Northwest once controls
are introduced). Women in the South are now shown to have about 20% lower
marriage hazard rates (RRR = 0.818), and this is highly signiﬁcant. The secular
decline in propensity to marry remains, indicated by the signiﬁcance of the dummy
variable for the 1961–70 birth cohort. Its magnitude is reduced, however. The
increase in the magnitude of the effect of regional dummy variable for the South
upon the inclusion of the employment measure is suggestive of a slightly different
employment-marital regime in that region. Once we control for employment,
women born in the South are actually even less likely to marry than women in other
regions; their lower rate of employment partly masks this.
Several other family background factors are strongly predictive of this ﬁrst step
in family formation. Women whose mothers worked when the women were aged 15
exhibit a marital hazard rate about 12% below those of other equivalent women.
Women whose fathers had low or no education marry at signiﬁcantly higher rates.
We ﬁnd no effect of parental mortality on union formation.
8 The education of the
women is quite strongly predictive of the rate of entry into marriage, showing a U-
shaped relationship. Women with low levels of education have a marriage rate 64%
above women with moderate levels of education. On the other hand, women with
high levels of education exhibit a hazard rate for duration to marriage 37% above
the middle group.
9
7 Women in the South macro region constitute a fairly large portion of our ILFI sample. Of the 7,250
women who initiate spells in our data ﬁle, 35.0% are living in the South at age 15.
8 By the time of the survey, 17.5% of the women had experienced the death of their father and 7.1% the
death of their mother.
9 Secular changes in educational attainment across these cohorts may confound these results, esp. if
relative education rather than absolute year of attainment points to the mechanism of interest.
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123Employment of the woman herself is of particular interest. Much contemporary
theory about very low fertility, as discussed above, would suggest that employment
would depress the family building activity of contemporary women. We ask not
only whether this is true, but also the magnitude of the effect and the extent of its
effect across time (birth cohorts) and across the successive family-building events
we examine with ILFI.
Model 2 of Table 2 indicates that on balance women’s employment operates to
signiﬁcantly and appreciably reduce the rate of entry into marriage to about 83% of
otherwise equivalent women. Clearly, net of these other traits, employment
lengthens the duration to marriage. This aggregate result (cohorts pooled) offers
support for the view that the decline in fertility commences with lower rates of entry
into marriage, in turn, partly driven by women’s employment.
10
Models 3–5 split the cohorts and repeat the analysis; thus, these models allow the
effects of traits to differ across the three cohorts of women. Women in the 1941–50
cohort have passed beyond the standard reproductive span by the time of the ILFI
2001 survey wave. Thus information for their union formation (as linked to fertility)
and childbearing should be complete. Some 88% of this cohort is observed to marry.
For these women we ﬁnd clearly visible effects of region, woman’s own education,
and employment. Parental background traits do not show through here. Women in
the South make the transition to ﬁrst marriage more slowly than women from other
regions of Italy. (Women in the Northeast and Center show relative risk rates below
unity, but these are not statistically signiﬁcant.) At the same time we ﬁnd that
women whose education is low or high experience more rapid marriage—the U-
shaped effect. This statistical result may be worth particular consideration in this
cohort, as the apparent inconsistency may point to competing mechanisms linked to
some of the overarching processes we identiﬁed at the outset. Certainly aspiration
for education and labor market participation are intertwined. As in the pooled results
working women make the transition to marriage less quickly, about 30% below the
transition rate of otherwise equivalent women.
Some elements of this nuptiality process change by the time the next cohort, born
1951–60, is observed. In this case, regional differences are muted further, with
almost no differential at all among Northeast, Northwest, and Center. The point
estimate for women from the South indicates a lower rate of transition into
marriage, but this difference is not statistically signiﬁcant. Personal and parental
traits have some predictive value, in a direction mostly consistent with an effect in
which higher socioeconomic status retards marriage. Women whose fathers had
little education experienced more rapid rates of marriage, while children of highly
educated fathers experience slower marriage. The woman’s own education matters a
good deal, and again, a U-shaped pattern is observed: poorly and highly educated
women are quicker to marry.
10 We also estimated a model that split the employment effect into (separate dummy variables for) full-
time and part-time work. In the pooled model and some cohort-speciﬁc models, the individual dummy
variables were statistically signiﬁcant; however, we always failed to reject the hypothesis of the constraint
that the two coefﬁcients are equal. Thus, we accept the hypothesis of equivalence and model the
employment effect overall.
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123The employment effect is statistically signiﬁcant, although its strength does not
match that found in other cohorts. In this middle birth cohort, we observe that
employed women enter unions at about 15% lower rates (RRR = 0.856) than other
equivalent women.
Our ﬁnal cohort comparison turns to women born in 1961–70, who are aged 31–
41 at the time of the survey. We observe 914 such women and nearly two-thirds of
them have married as of the survey date. This youngest cohort differs yet again from
the older two. Regional differences in rates of marriage transition have moderated
considerably. (No coefﬁcients are even marginally signiﬁcant.) Yet personal
background traits are predictive. Women whose fathers had little or no education (a
decreasing fraction of the population of women over time) entered into marriage
more quickly, while those whose mothers worked made this transition more
slowly.
11 The U-shaped effect of woman’s own education is visible once again,
although the only signiﬁcant effect indicates that poorly educated women are
quicker to marry.
Perhaps most notable in the Cox regression of this youngest cohort is the lack of
any effect of the woman’s own employment. It appears that with women’s work
becoming more common and, perhaps, normatively more accepted, it no longer has
the effect on discouraging marriage that it formerly did.
5 First Birth
We turn now more directly to our individual-level fertility analysis with a look at
the transition from marriage to ﬁrst birth. Since cohabitation is relatively uncommon
in Italy, and since childbearing outside of a formal union is relatively rare (although
increasing), we exclude cohabiting individuals from the risk set.
12
In our sample, some 92% of all women who had entered a formal union
experienced a birth by the 2001 wave of the ILFI survey. As was to be expected,
successive cohorts show a slowing down of transition to ﬁrst birth. While nearly
90% of the 1941–50 cohort experienced a birth within 5 years of marriage, only
about 80% of the 1961–70 cohort did so. But unlike the pattern we found in
transition to ﬁrst marriage, the transition from marriage to ﬁrst birth showed clear
regional differences across all cohorts (Fig. 2). Women in the South proceeded
more quickly to a ﬁrst birth after marriage than did women elsewhere; 92% of
women in the South had a child within ﬁve years of marriage compared to 83% of
women in the Northwest.
A simple Cox regression model with regional and cohort covariates alone
conﬁrms these graphical differences. Table 3 Model 1 points to statistically
11 In these two youngest cohorts (but not in the 1941–50) cohort an alternative model that included the
woman’s number of siblings indicating that woman who came from larger families of origin married
sooner. Since this covariate did not inﬂuence other covariates and was always non-signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst
and second birth models, we have not included in the basic models we present.
12 Alternative analyses, including a dummy covariate for ‘‘cohabitation,’’ showed lower fertility (lower
than civil union) for this group, but included relatively large standard errors (small N). At the same time,
qualitative inference for other covariates is not altered by excluding cohabiting women from the model.
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123signiﬁcant and high rates of childbearing in the Center and South, with
progressively slower rates of the transition to parenthood across cohorts. Model 2
introduces the standard set of personal covariates into the model. This model
includes covariates used above for union formation, but, to provide a test of SDT,
adds a dummy variable for type of union: civil marriage (versus religious).
Economic theory argues that woman’s employment (a time-varying covariate)
should serve to decrease the rate of transition to ﬁrst birth. Education and
socioeconomic background should work in corresponding ways, with higher status
women slower to make the transition. A strict interpretation would suggest that
regional (and cohort) differences should be reduced or even eliminated on the basis
of these additional controls. Persistent effects not consistent with the standard
explanation would suggest that regional differences and marital union type
differences would remain, even in this more comprehensive model.
In Table 3, Model 2 we ﬁnd only modest effects of some of the socioeconomic
background factors; mother’s work, father’s education, and parental mortality are all
non-signiﬁcant in this model. Even the woman’s own education offers little
additional power to predict ﬁrst birth transition. In this model regional and cohort
effects are reduced only slightly in magnitude from Model 1. Thus women in the
Center and South make the transition from marriage to ﬁrst birth at higher rates,
while women in recent cohorts make the transition more slowly, even after adjusting
for other characteristics.
We also include in this model covariates for woman’s age at marriage.
Collectively these ﬁve dummy variables (with marriage at age 25–29 as the
reference) are highly signiﬁcant. We observe that women who marry at the youngest
ages make the transition to ﬁrst child more rapidly, all else equal. Women who
marry at ages 35–39 make this transition much more slowly than the women in the
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13 There is no evidence of hastening the childbearing transition for
women who enter (ﬁrst) marriage at a later age.
Importantly, our primary measures of both FLFP theories and SDT theory
regarding very low fertility—woman’s employment and marital union type—are
strong predictors of the progression from union to ﬁrst birth. The relative risk of ﬁrst
birth transition for employed women is 0.81 and is one of the most powerful
predictors in the model. A similar effect (0.73) is indicated for women in a civil
union compared to a religious union. Again this effect is highly signiﬁcant. For a
woman who is both employed and in a civil union—together indicators of departure
from a more traditional family building style—the relative risk ratio is 0.59
(RRR = 0.813*0.728). In other words, for such women their rate of transition from
marriage to ﬁrst birth is 59% that of otherwise equivalent women.
We extend the analysis to look at this transition separately by cohort, and
estimated coefﬁcients appear in Models 3–5 of Table 3. In the 1941–50 cohort we
ﬁnd that women in the Center and South experienced higher rates of ﬁrst birth
transition. In the complete model, almost no covariates for background socioeco-
nomic traits are statistically signiﬁcant. This older cohort had few cases of civil
marriage and so it may not be surprising that no signiﬁcant differences between
women married civilly and religiously can be found here. We still ﬁnd a strong
effect of employment (RRR = 0.824), not much different from the model which
pools across all three birth cohorts. It is quite clear that employment, even in these
relatively early cohorts, is strongly and negatively associated with the transition to
ﬁrst birth.
14 Coefﬁcients for age at union are not particularly consistent or stable.
Still there is evidence that women who marry at younger ages (15–24) make the ﬁrst
birth transition more rapidly.
The story for the 1951–60 cohort differs only moderately. Again the background
traits of parental characteristics and woman’s own education do little to improve
prediction in the model. Notably, regional effects are not visible. While women in
the South and Central macro regions exhibit somewhat higher rates of transition, the
associated coefﬁcients do not achieve statistical signiﬁcance. (There are 703 women
at risk in this cohort.) By contrast, effects for employment and for union status are
strong and highly signiﬁcant. Employed women have a relative risk of ﬁrst birth
about 16% below other equivalent women in their cohort. Women in a civil union
have a 33% lower relative risk. As for the pooled sample these two traits in
combination (employed women in a civil union) predict a much lower rate of entry
into childbearing. Here again, women who marry at an early age (15–24) display a
more rapid rate of making the transition to ﬁrst birth.
The story for the 1961–70 cohort differs in several important respects from the
older two cohorts. These women are about age 31–41 in 2001 at the time of the last
IFLI wave we use here. They thus have not completed their reproductive span, so
that any additional timing shifts anticipated after 2001 cannot be captured by our
13 Further work will investigate what role premarital pregnancy may play in explaining the higher rates
of ﬁrst birth among the youngest age groups.
14 Coefﬁcients for parental traits do not achieve statistical signiﬁcance at conventional levels when
employment and woman’s own education are excluded from the model.
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123data. Regional differences re-emerge in this cohort. Notably women in the South
(RRR = 1.70; p\0.001) proceed much more rapidly to their ﬁrst birth. Women in
the Center also progress more rapidly, although this difference is only signiﬁcant at
the 10% level. Parental background traits are again of modest predictive value,
although we observe that women with fathers of the highest level of education have
lower childbearing rates (RRR = 0.597; p = 0.03). In this youngest cohort of 583
women, we observe less of an effect of age at ﬁrst union. What does show through is
that women who marry as teens have much higher transition rates than those who
marry in their twenties and early thirties. Here, though, the impact of bridal
pregnancy undoubtedly weighs heavily.
Being employed and in a civil (versus religious) union once again exert strong
downward effects on predicted fertility. Employed women exhibit hazard rates some
30% below non-working women. As was the case with previous cohorts, the
combination of working and being in a civil union serves to lower the predicted rate
of transition from union to ﬁrst birth appreciably, here by over one-half.
We also investigated alternative models for the transition to ﬁrst birth. In parallel
to our examination in the case of union formation, we tested for the effect of part-
time versus full-time employment. In a test of constraints across coefﬁcients, we
accept the null hypothesis of no difference in the effect of full- and part-time
employment. Also, we tested for the inﬂuence of the number of siblings of the
woman. A greater number of siblings might be expected to proxy a family
background in which traditional roles and/or larger family sizes are valued. (In turn,
this expectation would lead to a prediction of ﬁrst birth occurring more rapidly.) We
ﬁnd no evidence of this, as the covariate for number of siblings provided no
additional predictive power beyond the characteristics already in the model.
We also examined an alternative model that included interaction terms between
woman’s own education and age at union. These are added to both the pooled and
cohort-speciﬁc models, in which the ﬁrst-order covariates for education and age at
union appear as in Table 3. The joint test of the group of covariates indicates that
they are not collectively signiﬁcant. This indicates that there is no identiﬁable
further alteration of the effect of education across women who enter unions at
differing ages.
6 Second Birth
The third and ﬁnal element of our event history analysis focuses on second birth. In
our ILFI sample of women in the cohorts born between 1941 and 1970, some 1,914
have a ﬁrst birth, and of this group, 72% go on to bear a second child within the
observation period. Not only is this a (necessarily) smaller sample than the number
of women at risk of ﬁrst union and ﬁrst birth, it is more selective as well.
There are no pronounced cohort differences in the transition to second birth,
although it is evident that the 1941–50 cohort made the transition from ﬁrst to
second birth more rapidly than succeeding cohorts. Tabulations of the survivor
function point to 5-year transition fractions of 59%, 51% and 53% for the cohorts
successively. The youngest cohort is slow to make the transition for about 4 years
Italy’s Path to Very Low Fertility 107
123following ﬁrst birth, but after that point makes the transition more rapidly so that it
reaches a crossover with the other two cohorts within a decade of exposure. It is
worth recalling that the underlying sample contains more women in each of the
older two cohorts than in the youngest, since the youngest cohort is least likely to
marry and have a ﬁrst birth, requisites for being in the risk set for second birth.
Regional differences are noteworthy. While Fig. 3 shows no discernible differences
across Northeast, Northwest, and Central for the ﬁve years following ﬁrst birth,
women in the South make this transition much more rapidly.
Table 4, Model 1 points to statistically signiﬁcant and somewhat higher rates of
childbearing in the Northeast and the Center, compared to the Northwest. But
strikingly, the relative risk for the South is nearly double that for these other two
regions and close to three times the rate found in the Northwest. Cohort effects are
present, with both the 1951–60 and 1961–70 cohorts displaying a hazard rate about
15% below that of the reference group of women in the 1941–50 cohort. The fact
that the 1951–60 cohort differs little from the 1961–70 cohort in second-birth
transition while it does differ in ﬁrst birth transition (see above) suggests that
restriction of fertility at higher parities (even 2nd) had begun to make its way into
family building practice in this middle cohort, who were themselves passing through
key years of the reproductive span in the 1970s and 1980s.
Model 2 includes the standard set of covariates as in the models above. Addition
of these individual-level traits does virtually nothing to attenuate either the regional
or the cohort effects. Women from the Northeast and the Center display hazard rates
that are 21% and 23% higher than women in the Northwest, while again, strikingly,
women from the South experience the second-child transition at 2.6 times the rate of
women in the Northwest, even controlling for all of these individual-level traits.
Women whose mothers worked when the women were aged 15 show higher rates of
second birth transition. While this might be seen as contrary to expectation it may
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123reﬂect an intergenerational pattern of scheduling work and reproductive careers in
which the second birth is hastened by the existence of a maternal role model
balancing work and reproduction. Father’s education and that of the woman herself
carry little predictive value in this model. Those who have their ﬁrst child at an
earlier age also made the transition from ﬁrst to second child more quickly. Broadly
speaking, women who bore their ﬁrst child before age 25 moved on to the second
child at about 25% higher rate than women whose ﬁrst birth occurred when they were
aged 25–34. As in the case of both other transitions considered above, employed
women and those in civil marriages exhibit dramatically lower second birth
transition rates, with the combined effect of lowering the hazard rate by about 40%.
15
As with the models reported for the previous two transitions, Models 3–5 here
repeat the analysis by cohort. In the 1941–50 cohort, regional differences are quite
pronounced, with the South relative risk about 2.5 times the Northwest and the other
two regions intermediate and non-signiﬁcant. For this cohort of 681 women, about
75% of whom experienced a second birth, those with father’s education at the low
or high end of the distribution are shown to have slower rates of progression to the
second child. Women with limited education show no difference from women with
middle-range education, but women with high educational levels have much lower
second birth rates (RRR = 0.648). Employment continues to have much the same
effect as before, lowering predicted fertility by about 20%. The point estimate for
civil union indicates reduced fertility, but civil marriages are rare in this cohort and
the estimate does not achieve statistical signiﬁcance.
In the 1951–60 cohort, regional effects are similar to those found in the older
cohort. Women in the South bear their second child at rates about 2.5 times those in
the Northwest; women in the other regions are intermediate and their differences are
not statistically different from the reference region. No parental or personal traits for
education or parental loss are statistically signiﬁcant for this cohort of 666 women,
some 72% of whom bear a second child. Working women exhibited rates of
childbearing reduced by about one-ﬁfth (RRR = 0.811, p = 0.036). There were no
statistically signiﬁcant differences by union status or by age at ﬁrst birth, although
the presence of this latter group of dummy variables does alter other coefﬁcients.
In our youngest cohort, 1961–70, we have 508 women who initiated a spell with
a ﬁrst birth, and 65% of them are observed to go on to a second birth. Here the
regional rankings are similar to earlier cohorts, but we observe particularly
depressed fertility among women in the Northwest. Southern women have rates of
second birth almost four times as large as those in the Northwest (RRR = 3.73,
p\0.001). Rates for the Northeast and Center are about double the Northwest.
Few personal and parental background traits help predict this fertility transition,
save one: women’s own education. Women in the highest education category
exhibit transition rates to second birth 65% above other women. This may represent
15 An alternative model tested (via dummy variable interaction) whether employed women in the South
behaved differently from other women. This had no additional predictive power. Small numbers of
women are in a cohabiting union or not in any union during some of the time exposed to the risk of a
second birth. Models which included dummy covariates for these two traits indicated signiﬁcantly lower
relative risks for such women. Since other coefﬁcients were robust to these alternatives, we have used the
simpler speciﬁcation for ease of exposition.
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123a conscious fertility compression strategy for such highly educated (and profes-
sional) females. Working depresses the rate of transition to the second birth; its
effect is signiﬁcant and larger in magnitude than for previous cohorts.
As with the ﬁrst birth transition, we investigated alternative models for the
transition to second birth. Again, we ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant difference
between the effect of part-time and full-time employment. As before, the sibling
covariate was non-signiﬁcant. And ﬁnally, we again examined a model for an age-
education interaction. Here we include dummy variable for the interaction of
covariates for woman’s own education and her age at ﬁrst birth across the pooled
and cohort-speciﬁc estimations.
16 Once again, the joint test of the group of dummy
variable interaction terms was non-signiﬁcant; thus, the effect of education across
women who bear their ﬁrst child at differing ages is not seen to differ.
7 Conclusions
The Italian case has undermined conﬁdence in the two most prominent theories of
very low fertility: one that focuses on increases in women’s labor force
participation, and the other on a shift to less familistic and more secular values.
But if we move away from the country comparisons that tend to dominate this
literature and instead examine fertility in Italy in the context of individual lives, it
becomes clear that each of these theoretical approaches has value. At the same time,
each approach has limits. It is particularly interesting to discover that even regional-
level comparisons within Italy provided little support for either of these two
inﬂuential theoretical perspectives. It required individual-level life course data and
longitudinal analysis to demonstrate that both hypothesized sets of relationships
actually do play a role.
Indeed, our micro-level analyses showed that women’s employment has a strong
impact on Italians’ marriage and fertility behavior. Until the most recent cohort,
working women married more slowly. And throughout all cohorts, women’s
participation in the labor force had a consistently negative and powerful impact on
their childbearing. Women who were working were 20%–30% less likely (using
odds ratios from cohort-speciﬁc models) to make transitions to ﬁrst and second
birth. Similarly, although the statistical signiﬁcance was marginal due to the small
number of cases, there is intriguing evidence that those choosing a civil marriage—
and hence embracing more secular values and less subject to the church’s
inﬂuence—had lower birth transition rates than those who were married in church.
Clearly, this relationship merits further study as new data become available.
Yet even after controlling not only for women’s employment and civil marriage,
but also for a host of family and individual characteristics, very pronounced regional
effects were evident. This suggests that Italy’s regional differences are tapping
contextual effects that are not captured by existing economic or SDT theory and
may be rooted in social networks, provision of local public services, availability of
16 These models strain the more modest sample size for cohort-speciﬁc analysis, and some interactions
could not be estimated. Sufﬁce to say no compelling evidence appears for age–education interactions.
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123kin, and, especially, sociocultural norms regarding family building. The dramatic
size of these regional effects offers strong evidence of the need to look beyond
traditional economic and SDT theories in explaining declines in fertility.
Our work suggests several avenues for future research. First, effort should go into
further substantive speciﬁcations of these persistent regional differentials. Contex-
tual covariates, although not easy to assemble, might point to some of the regional
and local features—both social and policy-based—that could help promote or retard
these three transitions. Second, one might consider Livi-Bacci’s contention that,
contrary to SDT theory, it is the very surfeit of familism in societies such as Italy
that contributes to very low fertility (Livi-Bacci and Savini 2000; Livi-Bacci 2001;
Dalla Zuanna 2001). He argues that the intense interdependence between
generations is leading to a prolonged period of dependency in the younger
generation, and that this leads the younger generation to avoid, postpone, or in any
case limit their assumption of parental responsibilities and commitments. Although
this theory has proven difﬁcult to test, the argument is provocative and, given the
prominent place occupied by familistic societies among the pioneers of very low
fertility, worth putting to the test.
17 Third, it is important to look more closely at
gender relations as a potential key to explaining very low fertility. Focusing on
gender relations rather than familism, McDonald has offered an alternative
explanation for the Italian paradox. Drawing on Mason’s (1997) work, he (2000,
pp. 427–8) hypothesizes that ‘‘very low fertility in advanced countries today is the
outcome of a conﬂict or inconsistency between high levels of gender equity in
individual-oriented social institutions and sustained gender inequity in family-
oriented social institutions.’’ From this perspective, the fact that Italy and Spain
have such low fertility is explained by the preservation of a traditional gender
system in the context of expanding labor force opportunities for women. All three of
these lines of expansion could ﬂow from (and be consistent with) our work,
although developing well-speciﬁed empirical tests remains a challenge.
Perhaps most interesting for social science theory more generally, our work
serves both to recover and to challenge economic and cultural approaches to
explaining demographic behavior. While neither prevailing economic theory
(FLFP) nor SDT theory aimed at explaining very low fertility should be wholly
dismissed based on the Italian evidence—indeed each very likely points at forces
that have had an impact on Italy’s dramatic fertility decline—together they only
partially explain the Italian case. The lessons that Italy has to provide for our
understanding of very low fertility are still largely untapped, awaiting a fuller
exploration of the social, institutional, and cultural matrices in which the decision to
have children is made.
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